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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
VS. 
VERA MASON, 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 
13642 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a criminal prosecution 
of the Defendant, here Appellant, for 
theft during the course of which the 
jury heard certain admissions from the 
defendant on the stand relating to re-
cent use of narcotics and testimony from 
a police officer relative to the effect 
of narcotics use. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Objections of Defense counsel 
at the trial to testimony about nar-
cotics use and alleged expert testi-
mony as to effect of narcotics were 
overruled by the trial court. The jury 
found defendant quilty and she was 
duly sentenced and is now serving her 
term. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the 
judgment, vacation of sentence and dis-
missal of the case as having been tried 
under conditions so prejudicial as to 
have resulted in denial of a fair trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The matter came on to be heard 
in Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County; the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson presiding. The State of Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was represented by John R. Anderson, 
Esq., and the Defendant by Jack W. 
Kunkier, Esq., Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association. Various witnesses testified 
as to the circumstances surrounding a 
theft, and made various identifications. 
At the close of the State's case the 
Defendant, Vera Mason, was called in 
her own behalf and testified. After 
direct testimony the State's attorney 
began his cross-examination with the 
question, "Mrs. Mason, are you now under 
the influence of any narcotic?" Over 
objection of Defense counsel the Defen-
dant was directed to answer and replied 
"Somewhat, yes." (P.. 110, T. 66) State's 
next question was, "By <somewhat', would 
you tell us when you last took a drug 
and what it was?" Defendant replied, 
"About, let's see, about 8:30 this 
morning." (This testimony was given some-
time after 3:00 p.m. as may be seen from Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the colloquy between court and bailiff 
at page 50 of the Transcript (R 102) 
about the time then being twenty to three. 
A brief recess (R. 105 line 4) was had; 
and testimony filling eight pages of 
transcript was taken between "twenty 
to three11 and the Defendant's testimony 
about narcotics use. 
Defendant subsequently testified 
under cross examination as to the nar-
cotic she had used, heroin (R. Ill, 
line 2); the quantity, . two ten-dollar 
caps or baloons (R. Ill, lines 13, 15); 
her state of sensation, "Do you consider 
yourself as now being under full con-
trol of your faculties?" "Yes."; "Are 
you high?" Answer "No, I'm not." (R. Ill, 
lines 18-22) . 
An objection was sustained as to 
when Defendant planned to take nar-
cotics again, after which the follow-
ing testimony occurred; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. (By Mr. Anderson, the pro-
secutor) "Your testimony, then, is that 
you are now under the influence of the 
heroin that you took at 8:30 this 
morning?" 
Mr. Kunkler: "I believe she just 
testified that she wasn't." 
Mr. Anderson: "She can answer it." 
A. (Defendant) "I beg your pardon?51 
Q."You are then under the in-
fluence of the two caps of heroin that 
you took at 8:30 this morning?" 
THE COURT:"You are now under 
some influence from it?" 
A. "Well somewhat. It's mostly 
worn off. It's not - It's mostly gone 
out. I'm not high or anything from the 
effect of it."(R. Ill, 112 lines 27-30, 
1-9). Thereafter followed cross-examin-
ation relating to defendant's whereabouts 
on the date of the alleged theft. 
David W. King, a police officer 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was subsequently recalled by the state 
(R. 113), gave an account of his ex-
perience in narcotics related work 
(R. 114); gave his opinion as to what 
the effect of two balloons of heroin 
would have on a "normal" person taken 
at 8%30 in the morning "... the time 
now being a quarter to four?" (Hospi-
talization) (R. 115); gave his opinion 
as to the state of an addict under the 
same time interval (wanting some more; 
but neither extremely high nor in 
pain from withdrawal) (R. 116). Under 
cross-examination by defense counsel 
officer King testified about cutting 
of heroin and strengths (R, 117); kinds 
of heroin, Mexico brown and French 
white (R. 118), the kind and typical 
strength of heroin available in Salt 
Lake City (Mexico brown, "*.«typically 
3 to 7 percent9') , (R. 118) , and gave an 
opinion that an addict having taken Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such a dose at 8:30 would not by that 
time of day be "off in another world." 
(R. 119) . 
Defendant's admissions were 
objected to and overruled by the court 
three times. (R. 110, R. Ill) and the 
testimony of the officer as expert 
was objected to for lack of relevance, 
and overruled (R. 114); for lack of 
foundation (R. 114) (R. 115) and over-
ruled in each case. The State did not 
offer and the record does not disclose 
any proffer of testimony which would 
tend to show the truth of defendant's 
admissions by independent evidence. 
The court instructed the jury 
as to the credibility and prejudicial 
effect of the narcotics-use testimony 
(Ro 119-121) but the jury instruction 
on this point was oral and not submitted 
to the jury in writing since the court 
had not anticipated such testimony* (R. 119) . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant was found guilty as 
charged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT PROSECU-
TION TO ELICIT ADMISSION OF NARCOTICS 
USE ON MORNING OF TRIAL FROM DEFENDANT 
WITHOUT REQUIRING PROPER FOUNDATION 
AND WITHOUT REQUIRING STATE TO PROVE OR 
OFFER TO PROVE THAT MATTERS INSINUATED 
OR SUGGESTED ON CROSS EXAMINATION WERE 
TRUE BY INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE. 
No Utah cases directly in point 
have been found*. 
Cases from other jurisdictions 
are fairly numerous in holding that 
narcotics addicts are not thereby 
rendered incompetent as witnesses even 
though addiction be proved. 
There are a number of cases hold-
ing that evidence showing past ude of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
narcotics or effect of such may not 
usually be shown for purposes of im-
peaching the credibility of witnesses. 
People v Dixon, 22 111 2d 513, 177 NE2d 
224, cert den 368 US 1003, 7 L ed 2d 
542, 82 S Ct 637. People v Williams, 
6 NY2d 18, 187 NYS2d 750, 159 NE2d 
549, cert den 361 US 920, 4 L ed 188, 
80 S Ct 266. People v Sorrentini, 26 
App Div 2d 827, 273 NYS2d 981. Common-
wealth v Davis (Pa Super) 132 A2d 408; 
Commonwealth v Reginelli, 208 Pa Super 
344, 222 A2d 605. Tobar v State, 32 
Wis 2d 398, 145 NW2d 782. 
There appears to be a well-recog-
nized exception, however, where cross-
examination is directed to deter-
mination of whether a given witness is 
under the influence of narcotics while 
testifying* Campbell v U.S. (CAl 
Mass) 269 F2d 688. State v Reyes, 99 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ariz 257, 408 P2d 400. People v Perez, 
239 Cal App 2d 1, 48 Cal Rptr 596. 
People v Lewis, 25 111 2d 396, 185 NE2d 
168, State v Cox (Mo) 352 SW2d 665. 
State v Collins (Mo) 383 SW2d 747. 
The inquiry is permitted for 
purposes of showing lack of credibility. 
People v. Perez, supra. 
The Missouri courts have held that 
the extent of cross-examination to 
impeach credibility of a drug user is 
a matter for the trial court's discre-
tion. State v. Cox, supra.; State v. 
Collins, supra. 
Many older cases are summarized 
at 52 ALR2d 848-860 in an annotation 
"Use of drugs as affecting competency 
or credibility of witness." 
The earliest cases are reviewed 
and analyzed in an article "The Testi-
mony of Drug Addicts," George Rossman, 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3 Ore* L.Rev 81 (1924). 
Utah Code Annotated 77-44-5 pro-
vides that a defendant may be cross-
examined the same as any other witness 
and his or her credibility may be im-
peached by the same methods. 
A defendant or any other witness 
may be temporarily incompetent to testifv 
by reason of recent administration of 
narcotics. But it is a matter for the 
trial court's determination from per-
sonal observation whether the witness 
is able to understand questions and 
respond lucidly or whether he is tem-
porarily so impaired as to lack the 
qualifications of a witness. State v. 
Ballestros, 100 Ariz 262, 413 P2d 739. 
People v Dixon, 22 111 2d 513, 177 NE2d 
224, cert den 368 US 1003, 7 L ed 2d 
542, 82 S Ct 637. State v Cox (Mo) 
352 SW2d 665. 
The better reasoned cases impose Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
two requirements for the admissibility 
of testimony about recent narcotics 
use for purposes of impeachment of 
credibility* They are 1) a foundation 
must be laid and 2) the state must be 
prepared to at least proffer proof of 
either a history of addiction, some 
physical evidence of use, e.g. needle 
tracks, or independent proof of wit-
nesses use of drugs. 
The Appellate Court of Illinois has 
said; 
11
 [2] It is an elementary rule 
of trial procedure that for the 
purpose of impeachment, a wit-
ness may be ctoss-examined con-
cerning his drug addiction in 
order to disclose a matter af-
fecting his cridibility. (citing 
Illinois cases)* However, a 
foundation must be laid; and, 
once this is done, it is incum-
bent on the party who lays 
the foundation to offer proof 
of what is insinuated or sug-
gested in the impeaching 
cross-examination. (Citations) 
Failure to do so can, in a pro-
per case, result in infringe-
ment of the right to a fair 
trail. (Citations) Therefore, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it was improper for the 
assistant state's attorney 
to ask Urbina whether he 
used narcotics without 
being able to prove that 
he was an addict or a user 
of drugs. The trial judge 
erred in allowing the 
question and its answer to 
be read to the jury. (Citations)." 
People v. Telio, 1 111. App 
3d 526, 275 NE2d 222 at 225. 
The Court of Appeal for the 
Second District, Division 2, in Cal-
ifornia has quoted 52 ALR2d 848-849 
and added comment as follows: 
"As stated in 52 A.L*R2d 
at pages 848-849*- *The view 
adhered to by what may be called 
the weight of authority is 
that testimpny as to narcotic 
addictionf or expert testi-
mony as to the effects of the 
use of such drugs, is not con-
sidered admissible to impeach 
the credibility of a witness 
unless followed by testimony 
tending to show that he was 
under the influence while 
testifyingt or when the events 
to which he testified occurred, 
or that his mental faculties 
were actually impaired by the 
habit. A minority of the de-
cisions take the broad view 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that evidence of the use of nar-
cotics (may be introduced subject 
to) the qualifying factors men-
tioned above,* (See said A.L.R. 
reference for a summarv of cases 
supporting majority and minority 
views; see also So.Calif.Law 
Review, Vol. 16, page 333 et seq. 
for a discussion of this issue 
with appropriate citations of 
cases.) Reason and California case 
law compels the adoption of the 
majority view. The prosecution 
produced no witnesses nor made 
any offer of proof to indicate 
that Aiken was under the influ-
ence at any critical time or 
that his mental faculties were 
actually impaired by reason of 
addiction. The whole line of 
questioning on this subject was 
not only improper but highly 
prejudicial to appellant Ortega 
and could only have the effect 
of degrading the witness Aiken." 
(Emphasis added). People v 
Ortega, 2 col App3d 888 at 
9W7^83 Cal.Reptr 260 at 271. 
In the case at bar it does not 
appear that anywhere in the record 
did the State attempt to adduce or 
even make a proffer of independent 
proof of defendant's use of narcotics. 
The entire matter of the 
defendant-witnesses use of narcotics 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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depends on her own admission. An 
admission elicited from her before 
any foundation of any type had been 
laid by the statess attorney. An 
admission made over counsel's ob-
jection -and never subsequently 
corroborated by any independent evi-
dence whatever. In accordance with 
the principles enunciated in the better 
reasoned opinions, defendant respect-
fully submits that in this case, if 
anywhere, have failure to lay a 
foundation and to thereafter "offer 
proof of the matters insinuated or 
suggested in the impeaching cross-
examination" resulted in infringe-
ment of the right to a fair trial, 
POINT II 
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT A POLICE 
OFFICER WITH NARCOTICS SQUAD EXPER-
IENCE TO TESTIFY AS TO THE EFFECTS OF 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NARCOTICS IN GENERAL TERMS AND WITHOUT 
ANY PROBATIVE RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
DEFENDANT-WITNESS" PRESENT CONDITION 
AND WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE WHATEVER BE-
FORE THE COURT OR JURY AS TO THE TYPE 
OR STRENGTH OF NARCOTICS DEFENDANT 
MIGHT HAVE USED. 
In general terms the Utah rule 
on expert witnesses is that the quali-
fications necessary for a witness to 
testify as an expert depend on the 
nature of the case and the complexity 
of the particular matters on which he 
will testify. Startin v. Madsen, 120 
* 
U 631,237 Pe2d 834. It is a matter for 
the trial court to pass upon whether 
the matter requires expert testimony 
and if so what the necessary qualifica-
tions of the witness shall be, Webb 
Vo Qlin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 
(9 U2d 275, 342 P2d 1094, 30 i\LR2d 475). 
It is also the responsibility of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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court to closely scrutinize the 
qualifications of the expert witness, 
in view of the weight and significance 
to be given his testimony, in order 
to guard against giving undue credence 
to the pseudo-expert of charlatan. Id. 
In the present case the officer 
testified to two and a half years of 
police work in narcotics. He testified 
to having been to narcotics seminars, 
the Utah Police Academy narcotics 
investigation course, working a year 
undercover and stated that "experience" 
had been his greatest teacher. (R 114, 
T. 70). Immediately following that 
testimony he testified that he could 
not state with any degree of precision 
how much heroin was in a cap, "not in 
milligrams or anything" (R. 115, T. 71); 
that it would amount to something 
like half a cold capsule full, that it 
would be cut ®with lactose or something 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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like that" and that two balloons worth 
would hospitalize a "normal" (i.e. 
non-addicted) person. (R. 115; T. 71) 
He further testified on direct examina-
tion that an addict would be neither 
extremely high nor in pain of with-
drawal on two caps taken at 8:30 that 
same morning by the time he was testify-
ing, 3:45 p.m. (R 116, T. 72, line 10,11-19) 
He had previously testified that the 
mental state in which a heroin user 
would be, in his opinion, would depend 
on "....what habit the heroin user had, 
how much heroin he shows (sic), how 
much resistance he has, how long he or 
she had been on heroin." (R. 116, 
T. 72, lines 3-5). 
On cross-examination the officer 
testified as to the probable condition 
of an addict who might be accustomed 
to taking two caps at 8:30 in the 
morning of "current street heroin"; Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 117, T. 73); admitted that heroin 
may be "cut" many times by dealer, 
pusher (Id.); that strengths of cuts 
vary; that at least two kinds of 
heroin are available varying greatly 
in quality (R 118, T. 74, lines 17-26). 
The foregoing is all the testi-
mony that was offered on the subject 
of heroin and its effects. As to the 
defendant-witness who had previously 
assumed the stand in her own behalf, 
something she was not bound to do, 
this testimony without more served 
only to inflame the jury and to offer 
them nebulous criteria for impermissible 
speculation as to what the effects of 
a heroin use by the defendant early 
in the day of the trial might have been. 
There is no scintilla of evidence 
anywhere that the defendant in fact 
used any narcotic apart from her own 
admission extracted over her counsel's 
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made no showing that the balloons 
in this case contained heroin at all, 
that if they did it was of any particu-
lar type or grade, or that it was cut 
to a heavy or mild or non-narcotic 
dose by percentage. The jury could 
only conjecture from the paucity of 
proof and wealth of innuendo presented 
in officer King's testimony. 
Officer King's testimony is 
highly suspect as expert opinion evi-
dence* He claims no medical background, 
describes no physical symptoms* He is 
only able to state that experience has 
4 
taught him a good deal and that he has 
seen people in drugs. Nowhere in the 
record does it appear that he can 
characterize the defendant as appear-
ing as though under the influence of 
narcotics. Rather the officer?s testi-
mony is a series of conjectures as to 
20 
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how much or how little an addict might 
be "hurting" after an elapsed time of 
7 1/4 hours since a fix consisting 
of two caps of un unknown grade of an 
unknown variety of a substance identi-
fied only by the defendant over objection 
as heroin• 
Here as in Ortega (supra) "the 
whole line of questioning on this 
subject was not only improper but 
highly prejudicial to appellant ... 
and could only have the effect of 
degrading the witness", here the de-
fendant . 
The degradation of the witness 
in the jury5s eyes can readily be 
seenf when such evidence come in, is 
hashed and rehashed immediately before 
their deliberations, yet never tried 
by any shred of independent corrobora-
tive evidence to defendants condition 
21 
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at the time of trial, or to her past 
history of addiction, tolerance, 
quality of use or any other of the 
factors which the state's own pseudo-
expert witness himself testified 
would have to be factors to be con-
sidered in forming an opinion as to 
the defendants present state of mind. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, as a matter of law, 
is entitled to dismissal of the verdict 
against her and the vacation of 
sentences pursuant thereto because 
of prejudicial error in permitting 
the State's attorney to elicit damaging 
admissions relative to recent use of 
narcotics without first laying a foun-
dation and/or subsequently adducing 
or at least proffering independent 
corroborative evidence of defendant's 
2? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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alleged use; and because the state's 
expert witness 1) lacked the necessary 
expertise to testify meaningfully 
as to the effects of narcotics on the 
defendant and 2) what testimony he gave 
was never related to defendant, consisted 
of hypothetical narcotics effects 
based on generalities not meeting 
the standard of proof and had only the 
effect yjf prejudicing the jury against 
defendant since it was without proba-
tive value as to the effects of admitted 
drug use by her. 
i 
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